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I. INTRODUCTION

Privatization has arguably been the most important process in Israel's
economic and societal life during the past three decades. During the first 30
years of the country's existence, under the Labor Party's rule, the state
established, owned, and administrated significant segments of economic
activity, while others were subject to an intensified regulatory regime.1 From
the 1980s onward, however, all Israeli governments have moved toward
privatization.2 This shift was prompted both by internal developments and
international trends. Since 1977, most coalition governments in Israel have
been led by right-wing parties that traditionally leaned towards a market
economy.3 The inefficiency of many government industries, allied with
ambitions for integration in the global economy, triggered reforms.4 These
were largely welcomed by Israeli elites that were influenced by Americanoriented ideology (and to some extent, the public in general).5
*
Edwin A. Goodman Professor of Public Law, Faculty of Law, Hebrew
University, Jerusalem. The argument here-presented is based in part on Yoav Dotan & Barak
Medina, Legal Aspects of Privatization of the Supply of Goods and Services 37 MISHPATIM
(Law) 287 (2007) (Hebrew).
1
Daphne Barak-Erez, Applying Administrative Law to Privatization in Israel,
ISRAELI REPORTS TO THE XVI INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE LAW 47 2006)).
2
Yair Aharoni, Israel in Transition: The Changing Political Economy of Israel,
555 ANNALS. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 127, 146 (1998).
3
Aharoni, supra note 2, at 142.
4
Id. at 141.
5
Id. at 140.

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013

1

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 3

28

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1

Privatization carries significant potential benefits such as the
encouragement of free market competition and, consequently, the
enhancement of economic efficiency and improved resource allocation.6 It
also carries, however, potential drawbacks and dangers. Privatization of
state-owned industries often results in massive layoffs and may bring about
unemployment and social disorder.7 To the extent that privatization involves
the delegating of governmental functions such as prison management,
security tasks, or welfare services to privately owned actors, other problems
arise, such as deterioration in the conditions and availability of the services
and even infringements of human rights.8 The private provider of services to
the elderly may reduce the quality of the service in order to enhance profits.9
A privately owned jail may cut costs at the expense of the prisoners'
conditions and safety, and so forth.10
The above mentioned benefits and drawbacks of privatization are
contingent on many factors, such as the quality of the privatization plan, the
nature and structure of the relevant market, privatization's success in
inducing efficient market competition, the quality of the regulatory regime
that follows privatization, and so forth.11 There is one consequence of
privatization, however, that is inherent to the very process of privatization.
The inducement of a free market structure to a service that was previously
provided for free (or at a low, fixed, and regulated charge), such as
healthcare, education, or welfare services, inevitably creates a gap between
those who can pay for the service and those who cannot. The distributive
implications of privatization are the focus of my analysis.
II. PRIVATIZATION: DEFINITIONS AND TECHNIQUES
Privatization can be broadly defined as a policy designed to decrease
government involvement in economic life and/or to introduce market
mechanisms to the provision of public goods.12 One can distinguish in this
respect between two elements of privatization that, combined, compose full
privatization. The first element is outsourcing. It refers to the question of
who provides the service or manages the relevant assets (for example, a
government contract with a private supplier to provide a service previously
provided by the government itself, such as healthcare or park management).
Alternatively, the government can keep the management of public hospitals
in its own hands, but begin charging the public market prices for the use of
6

See, e.g., A. Doron & H.J. Karger, The Privatization of Social Services in
Israel and its Effects on Israeli Society, 2 SCAND. J. SOC. WELFARE 88, 90-92 (1993).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 91.
11
Id.
12
Doron & Karger, supra note 6, at 88.
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healthcare services. This second component of privatization refers to the
financing mechanism of the service and can be called commercialization.
These two elements are often (but not always) combined in one move to full
privatization (for example, the government contracts a private company to
run the national parks, and the latter starts collecting entrance fees to parks
previously open with no charge to the public).
It should also be noted that from the point of view of public law, the
concerns entailed by each element of privatization are somewhat different.
Outsourcing may bring about infringements of workers' rights. It may also
harm the customers' interests due to deteriorating quality of service, and
infringe on human rights (as in the case of prison privatization).13
Commercialization, on the other hand, directly infringes equality in the
provision of the service. That is, a service that was previously provided to
everyone for free (or for a nominal equal charge) is now available only for
those who can buy it at market prices. Accordingly, it is only the element of
commercialization that directly raises distributive concerns.
There are various techniques for achieving the aim of privatization.
Some are more formal and involve all three branches of government. For
example, the government can initiate legislation to privatize certain
industries, such as those in the field of communication.14 The state can also
privatize by selling governmental property, including state-owned
companies.15 Likewise, the government may introduce regulations that demonopolize certain markets, terminate the involvement of government
actors, and open up these markets to new competitive private players.16
These moves are formal in the sense that they are carried out by legislation,
with full involvement by the political system and the public, and are subject
to judicial review.
There are other techniques of privatization that are much less formal.
In some cases the government can simply contract out (with or without
public procurement)17 and delegate certain functions to private actors.
Likewise, the government can induce market mechanisms to certain fields
simply by failing to enforce regulation aimed at constraining private
13

Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance, HCJ 2605/05, 12 (Israeli Supreme Court 2009).
14
See e.g. Communications Law 5742-1982 (Isr.), which initially gave a
monopolized license to one government-owned company to operate telephone service in Israel
(Bezeq). The government later sold the company to private investors.
15
See Government Companies Law 5735-1975 (Isr.). The Law was amended in
1993 through the addition of chapter H1 entitled "Privatization." The new chapter regulates, in
detail, the process of privatization of governmental corporations. See Barak-Erez, supra note
1, at 50.
16
For example, the Communication Law (supra note 14) was amended during the
1990s and the 2000s to enable the government to award licenses for television and cable
broadcast and other modes of communications, and to create competitive market for such
services.
17
Under the Duty of Procurement Law 1992 (Isr.), most governmental contracts
must be signed after competitive procurement is published.
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initiative in these fields. Likewise, the government may pull out of certain
fields through executive decisions, budgetary cuts, and managerial moves.
Such informal moves may seriously influence the public but are often carried
out with hardly any involvement of the legislature and away from public
attention. As such, they raise serious concerns of democratic accountability.
Let us demonstrate the above point by the following example:
suppose that certain healthcare services, such as ambulance emergency
services, are provided at a certain point in time by a public corporation that is
financed by the government and enjoys a monopoly entrenched by
regulations. 18 This corporation provides emergency services to the whole
population and charges a regulated, fixed, nominal charge for the service.
Suppose now that the government seeks to privatize the service. One way to
do so is by initiating legislation that would reform the whole field by
allowing private companies to provide the service, and redefining the
functions of the public corporation. Adopting such a strategy may prove
politically costly, however. It requires legislation. It would be scrutinized
both by the opposition and the media that may raise hard questions regarding
the impact of such a move on the public, and more specifically on the poor.
Alternatively, however, the government may choose a much less
formal course of action. It can soften restrictions on the activity of private
suppliers of emergency ambulance services by using the existing regulatory
regime, and by granting licenses. It can also refrain from enforcing certain
regulatory restrictions and turn a blind eye to violations by these players.
Such informal, unofficial practices may encourage private suppliers to enter
the field. At the beginning of the process, one would expect that the prices
offered by the private suppliers would be much higher than those charged by
the public corporation. Therefore, at the initial stage, the private sector would
attract only the very wealthy. This may gradually change, however,
particularly if the government adds to the above strategy one additional
(seemingly "neutral") move: budgetary cuts. Such cuts in the budget of the
public corporation would bring about a deterioration in the quality of service,
thereby making it much less attractive to customers. At that stage, the middle
class is effectively pushed into joining the customer pool of the private
market (which, as a result is expected to expand the range of its services and,
to some extent, to lower prices). As a result, more private actors join the
market and more customers abandon the public service, which is
deteriorating due to further budgetary cuts. The end result (and final stage of
the process) is a situation in which the public corporation that previously
provided services to everyone now functions as part of a welfare network,
providing low-level services only to the very poor who cannot afford to
purchase the service in the market. Adopting such an informal strategy may
be politically tempting from the government's point of view. The process is
18
This was the case in Israel before 1980. A public corporation (Magen David
Adom) enjoyed a monopoly in the provision of emergency ambulance services.
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performed with minimal legal formalities and with little public attention or
media coverage. The end result of privatization may be presented not as the
result of an official premeditated plan, but as an almost coincidental
consequence of some fragmented, seemingly unrelated occurrences: an
economic crisis that requires (across the board) budgetary cuts, the "neutral"
function of market forces, and so forth.
The above example of ambulance service signifies many processes
of privatization that took place in Israel during the past four decades. While
some privatization moves were carried out by taking the formal course, most
processes of privatization were not. Rather, privatization was carried out by
using informal techniques without legislative approval (sometimes even
without any regulatory changes) and away from the public eye. Thus, public
hospitals began offering special private healthcare services for market prices;
public schools, officially created to offer free education to all, began offering
extra classes and activities for pay (particularly in wealthy neighborhoods).19
Other fields, previously considered as part of the public service to all
citizens, were subjected to the market regime by effective mechanisms of
informal privatization.20
III. PRIVATIZATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
What was the position of the Israeli judiciary regarding
privatization? In general, the involvement of the courts in administrative and
political decision-making in Israel is robust, and the past three decades have
reflected a significant increase in the scope of judicial review.21 During the
1980s, the Supreme Court dramatically changed its policy on standing to
allow any person to challenge an illegal or unconstitutional governmental
decision, even if the petitioner had no special personal interest in the issue at
stake.22
The Court also dramatically changed its policies on the judiciability
doctrine to allow petitions that involved sensitive political questions to be
judicially decided.23 Accordingly, the Court significantly expanded the scope
of judicial review with regard to almost all aspects of governmental decisionmaking. As the result, the Supreme Court became a tempting arena for
interest groups and organizations to pursue ideological and political causes.24
The scope of judicial review was further increased in 1992 when the Knesset
19

Yoav Dotan & Barak Medina, Legal Aspects of Privatization of the Supply of
Goods and Services 37 MISHPATIM (Law) 287 (2007) (Hebrew).
20
Id.
21
See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Inventing Judicial Review: Israel and America, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 2013, 2014 (1989).
22
HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defense 42(2) PD 441 [1988] (Isr.).
23
Id.
24
Yoav Dotan & Menachem Hofnung, Interest Groups in the High Court of
Justice: Measuring Success in Litigation and in Out-of-Court Settlements, 23(1) LAW & POL’Y
1 (2001).
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(the Israeli parliament) passed two new Basic Laws (including the Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), to which the Supreme Court ascribes
constitutional status.25 Later, during the 1990s and 2000s, the Supreme Court
widened the scope of administrative and constitutional review by lengthening
the list of constitutionally protected rights and by including socio-economic
rights in the list of protected rights.26
Given the fact that the rise in the scope of judicial review took place
at roughly the same period when privatization was intensifying, one might
expect that the judiciary would intensively scrutinize practices and decisions
related to privatization. The reality, however, proved otherwise. The abovedescribed transformation of major segments of society to privatization took
place with very minimal involvement on the part of the courts. This judicial
passivity stood in sharp contrast to the overall activist policies of the
Supreme Court (and the court system in general).
One way to explain this state of affairs is to suggest that the Supreme
Court refrained from intensive intervention in privatization because
privatization corresponded with the liberal ideological inclinations of the
Court.27 This "attitudinal" hypothesis, however, does not seem to provide a
consistent explanation for the Court's policies in the socio-economic field
during recent decades.28 Thus, for example, during the same period, the
Court developed rich jurisprudence regarding the constitutional status of
socio-economic rights. It acknowledged the right to minimal income, to fair
housing, and to proper education as constitutional rights that the state must
provide to every citizen, even though such rights have never been entrenched
in any constitutional text.29 Moreover, the ideological hypothesis seems to
have suffered a serious blow, specifically with regard to privatization, after
25

Israel has no formal written constitution, but according to accepted
constitutional convention, the Knesset holds the power to form "Basic Laws" that would serve
as chapters to the future constitution when completed. After the formation of the new Basic
Laws in 1992, the Supreme Court ruled that the new Basic Law constitutes the "bill of rights"
for Israel, and that the judiciary is authorized to invalidate regular legislation that infringes on
the rights entrenched by the Basic Law. CA 6821/93 Bank Ha'mizrachi v. Migdali 49(4) PD
221 [1994] (Isr.). See also David Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A MiniRevolution in Israeli Constitutional Law?, in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 141 (Itzhak Zamir &
Allen Zysblat eds., 1996).
26
See infra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial expansion of
protected socio-economic rights).
27
This line of explanation was indeed adopted by various academic critics of the
Court. See, e.g., Eyal Gross, The Israeli Constitution: A Tool for Distributive Justice, or A
Tool Which Prevents It?, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN ISRAEL 79 (M. Mautner, ed., 2000)
(Hebrew); Guy Mundlak, Social and Economic Rights in the New Constitutional Discourse:
From "social rights" to the "social dimension of all rights," 7 THE LABOR LAW YEARBOOK 65
(1999) (Hebrew).
28
See, e.g., Jeffery A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (discussing the “attitudinal” hypothesis).
29
See Yoav Dotan, The Supreme Court as the Protector of Social Rights, in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 69 (Yoram Rabin & Yuval Shani eds., 2003)
(Hebrew).
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the Court's celebrated decision on the Private Prison Case.30 In that case, the
Israeli Supreme Court ruled that privatization of prisons is unconstitutional
per se, regardless of the empirical conditions in private prisons.31 It declared
that the very subjection of prisoners to imprisonment in a non-governmental
prison infringes the prisoners' right of human dignity.32 Thus, in this decision
the Court expressed a robust anti-privatization ideology, and became the first
higher judicial institution ever to strike down privatization of prisons.33
Hence, it seems that the very limited impact that the Israeli judiciary
has had on privatization processes cannot be explained on the basis of the
ideological inclinations of the Supreme Court. Rather, I argue that the
explanation has to do with the limitations of the legal doctrines that the Court
employed, and the failure of the Court to develop non-traditional tools to
deal with informal privatization. In order to demonstrate the point, we now
turn to the legal doctrines that the judiciary employed with regard to
privatization.
IV. PRIVATIZATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Given the pervasiveness of privatization in many segments of
society, and the informal (sometimes even covert) nature of many practices
in the field, only a small portion of privatizations were brought to judicial
review. But even in these cases, the courts were not equipped to understand
the nature and implications of privatization and to effectively review them.
In fact, most existing doctrines in public law not only failed to provide for
effective constraints, but were designed in a way that encouraged
privatization and inhibited the ability of the law to effectively review it. The
first doctrine that served in this respect is the deference principle. When the
legality and reasonableness of decisions to privatize were challenged, the
Court treated the issue as a matter of economic policy that merits
considerable deference on the part of the judiciary.34
Another doctrine often employed in privatization cases was the
doctrine of delegation of statutory powers.35 Whenever the government
30
HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center for Law and Business v. Minister of Finance 27
[2009]
(Isr.).
An
English
translation
is
available
at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.pdf.
See
also Daphne
Barak-Erez, The Private Prison Controversy and the Privatization Continuum, 5 LAW &
ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 139 (2011); Barak Medina, Constitutional limits to privatization: The
Israeli Supreme Court decision to invalidate prison privatization, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 690
(2010).
31
See Academic Center for Law and Business v. Minister of Finance, HCJ
2605/05 at 127.
32
Id. at 142.
33
See Medina, supra note 30, at 2.
34
See Dotan & Medina, supra note 20 at 305-306.
35
See Sir William Wade & Christopher Forsyth, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 347-58
(7th ed. 1994).
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contracted private actors to provide services or to manage public assets, the
court treated the action as delegation.36 Under the framework of delegation,
the main question is whether the governmental agency delegated to the
private party the very statutory (discretionary) power (which is unlawful
under the ultra-vires doctrine),37 or whether the delegated functions were
merely "executive" (non-discretionary and "ancillary") in nature.
Indeed, the courts took notice of the fact that in privatization, the
delegatee of the governmental power is a private entity wholly outside the
framework of the state. They ruled that such cases of delegation raise special
concerns, since private actors might abuse the delegated power in order to
enhance their profits, undermining the purposes of the delegation and the
original intention of the legislature. Accordingly, they advocated caution
before delegation, and required special assurances to avoid conflicts of
interest.38 However, the whole legal framework of delegation seems wholly
unfit to deal with the privatization phenomenon. It was designed to regulate
the delegation of power from one public agency to another (or, most
commonly, from one official to another within the same administrative
agency). It completely ignores the major distributive impact of privatization,
and is thus unfit to effectively deal with the conditions and consequences of
privatization.
A third doctrine of administrative law that was applied to
privatization is the doctrine of semi-public actors. Under this doctrine,
developed by the Supreme Court during the 1980s, the requirements of
public law, such as the principle of equality and the rules against bias, apply
not only to state agencies but also to various other actors that provide
services to the public. This doctrine enables the Court to apply principles of
public law to entities such as utility companies, healthcare providers,
universities, and even sport clubs.39
At the outset, this doctrine seems perfect for dealing with
privatization, since it implies that even when the government privatizes
certain services by assigning private actors to provide them, the provision of
the service still remains regulated by public law since the "private"
contractor is classified as a "semi-public" entity and must abide by the
principles of public law. A closer look at this doctrine, however, reveals the
fact that it is ill-equipped to deal with the distributive consequences of
privatization. This is because the principles of public law prohibit
discrimination on the basis of political grounds such as race, gender,
ethnicity, etc. There is nothing in the doctrine of equality, however, that bans
discrimination on socio-economic grounds. Thus, for example, under this
36

Id. at 352-358.
Id. at 347.
38
HCJ 39/82 Henfling v. Mayor of Ashdod 36(2) PD 541 [1982] (Isr.); CA
4855/02 Borovitz v. State of Israel [2005] (Isr.).
39
HCJ 731/86 Micro Daf v. Israel Electric Corp. Ltd. 41(2) PD [1987] (Isr.); CA
3414/94 On v. Diamond Exchange 49(3) PD 196 [1995] (Isr.).
37
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doctrine, utility companies and healthcare providers are not allowed to deny
service on the basis of ethnicity and/or to discriminate against potential
customers on the basis of race or gender. They are, however, allowed to
discriminate between customers on the basis of their ability to pay for the
service. Thus, while creating the allure of "equality," the doctrine completely
fails to cope with the distributive consequences of privatization.
Doctrines referring to fundamental human rights also played a role
with regard to privatization. In 1992, the Knesset passed two new Basic
Laws that included a list of entrenched rights which formed the constitutional
framework for future legislation. Among the rights embedded in the new
Basic Laws were the right to own property and the right to pursue free
trade.40 The fact that such "libertarian" rights were bestowed with
constitutional status was certainly conducive to processes of privatization, at
least in the sense that it could fortify the already existing deferential
tendencies of the Court towards policies and practices of privatization.41
More interesting in this respect is the doctrine of socio-economic
rights developed by the Court during the same period.42 The Court ruled that
despite the fact that rights such as education, healthcare, housing, or minimal
income were not mentioned in the constitutional text of the new Basic Laws,
these rights are included in the fundamental right to human dignity.43 On the
face of the matter, the development of an activist doctrine of fundamental
rights in the socio-economic field might serve as a constraint against the
distributive consequences of privatization. In reality, however, the reverse
proved to be true. This is because the idea of fundamental socio-legal rights
does not require full distributive equality with regard to relevant social goods
(such as healthcare, housing, or education). It only provides for some
minimal (constitutional) level of service that the state must supply to every
member of society. The problem is, of course, that when one deals with the
distributive outcomes of privatization, the doctrine does not constrain the
process but rather approves its very essence and outcomes. This is because
the starting point of privatization is complete equality in the provision of the
service, and its end result is the creation of a free market that serves most
people, with some minimal assurance of (an inferior) public level of services
to the poor.44 Thus, the socio-legal rights doctrine is conducive to the
outcomes of privatization because it only takes care of the minimal (welfare)
level, while completely neglecting the overall impact of the process.
The above discussion leads to another paradigm that was
conspicuous in the Court's rulings on privatization. When the Court
encountered arguments against the distributive impact of privatization, it was
40

See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the Basic Laws).
Id.
42
See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions regarding
the constitutional status of socio-economic rights).
43
Id.
44
See supra text on pgs. 5-6 (explaining the end result of privatization).
41
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always willing to accept the infringement of socio-economic equality if the
government ensured some "basic," "minimal" level of public service.45 Thus,
for example, when a public action organization attacked a decision to
privatize a municipal park (that was previously open to all for no charge), the
Court dismissed the petition while stating that there remain other (albeit less
modern and equipped) parks open to the general public in the relevant
municipality.46
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO PRIVATIZATION
The failure of the traditional doctrines of public law to cope with
privatization (and, particularly, with informal privatization) raises the
question of whether existing doctrines of public law can serve this purpose at
all, or whether we need to create completely new doctrines in this respect. I
argue that, in fact, existing doctrines of administrative law may well provide
proper constraints on processes of privatization. But before I present the
argument, some clarifications are needed with regard to the proper role of the
judiciary in privatization.
What then is the proper role of the courts with regard to
privatization? At the outset it seems clear that the primary decision whether
to privatize certain fields of economic or social activity should not be taken
by the judiciary. Decisions on privatization are major social decisions that
should be made by the political branches. The judiciary has neither the
professional expertise nor the democratic mandate to make such decisions.
On the other hand, the decision as to how the government should
decide on privatization, i.e. what should be the proper process for
privatization, should be in the domain of the judiciary. In other words, if the
democratic community in country X decides to privatize its national
healthcare system, it is not for the judiciary to decide whether such a
decision is right or wrong. The judiciary, however, is awarded the role of
making sure that the relevant democratic community so decided. This means
that when major decisions on privatization are made behind closed doors, by
unelected, mid-level bureaucrats, without any specific legislative mandate
and with no public participation, it is the role of the judiciary to intervene in
order to verify that the proper democratic process was carried out.
VI. CONCLUSION
How can we achieve this goal? I suggest we use the old and simple
concept of legality. That is, I suggest that whenever the government proposes
45
HCJ 8676/00 Adam Teva Vedin (Man, Nature and Law) v. Municipality of
Ra'anana 59(2) PD 210 [2004] (Isr.).
46
Id. at 228. See also, e.g., HCJ 205/94 Nof v. Ministry of Defense 50(5) PD 449
[1997] (Isr.).
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to privatize major public services, it would be required to present a clear
legislative mandate and to meet due process requirements. After all, under
the ultra-vires doctrine, the judiciary requires a clear statutory mandate (and
due process) whenever the government decides to nationalize private
property (i.e., whenever society decides to bring something that was
previously private into the public domain). Why shouldn't we make the same
demands whenever the government does the reverse? Indeed, traditional
doctrines of public law such as legality and due process were developed on
the basis of the liberal ideas of the eighteenth century. The massive
distributive implications of privatization in the past four decades suggest that
we should renew these same doctrines in order to answer the contemporary
problems of informal, covert privatization.
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